abstract The objectives of this paper are to outline the contribution of internalization theory to our understanding of the governance of the MNE, and to highlight aspects of the theory that we believe have received insufficient attention in the literature. In particular, we suggest two promising lines of future research. The first focuses on the internal transaction costs associated with the governance and organization of the activities within the MNE, and here we highlight the costs of information acquisition and transmission, the costs of coordination, and the costs of aligning the interests of different stakeholders within the MNE. The second addresses the implications of different assumptions about the risk propensity of the MNE.
INTRODUCTION
Internalization theory has long provided one of the main theoretical rationales for the existence of the multinational enterprise. It is founded on the basic idea that the exploitation of firms' knowledge-based assets across national boundaries is often most efficiently undertaken internally within the hierarchical structure of the multinational enterprise (MNE). Internalization theory has not been without its critics, notably by proponents of the evolutionary theory of the firm (Kogut and Zander, 1993) . We believe that much of this criticism is misplaced, but that nevertheless the extant literature on internalization theory has focused too much on imperfections in the external markets for knowledge transfer. We argue below that not enough attention has been given to both the nature and the significance of the transactions costs associated with the internal transfer of knowledge and to some of the underlying assumptions of the theory.
In particular, we wish to suggest two promising lines of future research. The first focuses on the internal transaction costs associated with the governance and organization of the activities within the MNE, and here we highlight the costs of information acquisition and transmission, the costs of coordination, and the costs of aligning the interests of different stakeholders within the MNE. The second addresses the implications of (2001, pp. 655-6 ) points out, resource-based theory delineates the set of market imperfections that lead to sustainable rents, while internalization theory hypothesizes that the existence of those rents is sufficient to explain the existence of the MNE.
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNAL TRANSACTION COSTS
The internalization decision has been well analysed in the analysis of the growth of the (multinational) firm. What has not been so well analysed is the precise configuration of the internal architecture of the firm; that is, its governance structure (Buckley and Carter, 1996 , 2002 , 2003 .
An attempt to show the power of these ideas was made by Teece (1983) , who investigated technological and organizational factors as determining the scope of the firm through production costs. Teece's analysis of horizontal integration envisages governance costs and production costs as both being a function of an 'index of the complexity of know-how' in the firm. Governance costs of different forms of doing business abroad (licensing versus foreign direct investment, FDI) are a function of the complexity of technology. He assumes that the FDI mode is invariant to increasing complexity of knowledge because of the ease with which tacit knowledge can be transferred by internal markets. In contrast, the governance costs of licensing increase with the complexity of knowledge because of increasing costs of firm-to-firm transfer. A similar evaluation is made of the production costs in each mode. Production costs and governance costs are then summed to give the total costs of the modes of doing business abroad so that an optimal scope of horizontal integration is given for each level of complexity of know-how. A parallel exercise is conducted for vertical integration. Market-based relations are contrasted with vertically integrated relations by making their governance costs of market relations and vertical integration functions of an index of asset specificity where vertical integration has both a set-up cost (higher than setting up market relationships) and a lower variable cost of operation. As asset specificity increases, so does the possibility of integration.
In Teece's model (which has much in common with Buckley and Casson, 1981) , governance costs are a function of complexity of knowledge and asset specificity. There is also a (minor) international determinant of governance costs of integration -the risk of expropriation. The greater these risks, the more international governance costs will rise, favouring arm's length relationships (licensing, purchasing) rather than internal ones (FDI, integration). Teece's analysis is an interesting attempt to put governance costs centre-stage in the analysis of MNEs, but it does so only as an intermediate variable -the real drivers are complexity of (tacit) knowledge and asset specificity -and it has a weak international dimension. That governance costs and production costs are separable and additive also requires justification, at the least.
If we step back from Teece's exposition to Williamson's basic framework, we can first agree with Williamson's most recent work that markets and hierarchies are not dichotomous alternatives, but may be more like extreme points on a continuum. Williamson (1979, p. 103) argues that 'governance structures -the institutional matrix within which transactions are negotiated and executed -vary with the nature of the transaction'. All transactions are not equal. Some may be endowed with social characteristics which others lack. Moreover, repeated transactions may take on a different character than one-off deals. This opens the possibilities for a more rounded discussion of governance costs.
These theoretical arguments on the internal organization of the firm suggest two polar extremes. On the one hand, there is the purist view of internalization, expounded by Buckley and Casson (1976, 1985) , in which the firm functions as an approximation to a perfect market. This can be contrasted, on the other hand, with the 'markets and hierarchies' approach of Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1979 , which considers that integration (internalization) is accompanied by suspension of the price mechanism and the allocation of internal resources by management fiat. In the first of these approaches, the firm's internal organization is designed so as to transmit shadow prices to managers between decentralized cost centres and profit centres, so that the overall profits are maximized (Buckley, 1983) . Each decision-maker within the firm maximizes profits, given the internal prices; in effect, the firm includes in these prices an optimal tax, leaving members with an income which is just enough to keep them in their present employment (Hirshleifer, 1956) . In contrast, the 'markets and hierarchies' approach asserts either that bounded rationality and opportunism render it impossible to find the 'correct' prices even in an internalized market, or that individuals' responses to price would result in damaging externalities for the rest of the organization. Hierarchy overcomes these problems by constraining actions through management directive rather than price signals, replacing the market by another mechanism and not merely internalizing it.
In practice, internal organization often lies between these two extremes. The activities within the firm are many and various, and are undertaken by many different individuals. There are linkages between the activities of different individuals, in that the actions of one are typically complementary to those of other individuals. The strategy followed by the firm, and ultimately the value of the firm, depends upon how these activities are coordinated (Buckley and Carter, 1996) . But the actual internal division of labour gives rise to three problems of organizational design. The first is the information problem, which arises because few individuals within the firm are likely to possess all the information that they require to choose the optimal action for which they have responsibility. The division of labour within the firm suggests that the requisite information is likely to be held by different individuals, and furthermore there will typically be uncertainty over the effects of any particular course of action. The second is the coordination problem, which arises from the complementarity of actions. Perfect coordination can typically only be achieved by allocating all tasks to the same individual, but an approximation to this may be achieved through individuals working together within teams. The third is the motivation problem, which arises from the differences between the goals of the employees, the managers, and the shareholders. Each will typically favour actions which maximize their own utility, but which may or may not be consistent with the objective function of the firm. For instance, employees may shirk in their duties, whilst managers may initiate firm strategies from which they derive private benefits even if such strategies are non-optimal for the firm. Now it would be possible to formulate an optimal strategy to maximize the objective function of the firm (e.g. to maximize the value of the firm) if:
• all members of the firm had access to the best decision-relevant knowledge (perfect information); • all complementary actions were chosen jointly (perfect coordination); and • all members of the firm shared the firm's objective function (perfect motivation).
In practice, this is highly unlikely and there will be both costs and losses which are the result of derogation from the optimal set of actions. These internal transaction costs include: the costs of acquiring and transmitting information (information costs); the costs of communication about complementary actions or of providing for them to be combined (coordination costs); and the cost of incentive schemes to align the actions of the members of the firm with the objectives of the firm (motivation costs). These motivation costs would include both the costs of managerial supervision and monitoring of employees' actions and/or the costs of training and socializing designed to induce employees to adopt the firm's objectives, and the agency costs which arise from the fact that the principals (shareholders) have delegated responsibility of the day-to-day operations of the firm to agents (managers). The losses include: the reduction in the optimal pay-off to the firm caused by members not having the best available information (information loss); the reduction in the pay-off to the firm arising when complementary actions are not chosen jointly (coordination loss); and the reduction in the pay-off to the firm caused by members pursuing their own objectives (motivation loss). These losses are, in effect, internal 'externalities' arising from the division of managerial labour within the firm, and the associated costs measure the resources deployed in correcting the externalities. The goal of the firm's governance structure is to minimize the sum of these internal transaction costs and the losses.
The organizational externalities and costs (information, coordination, and motivation), and therefore problems of governance, will be more severe in MNEs than in purely domestic firms (Buckley and Carter, 1996) . The simplest set of factors which increase the information costs of communication and the exchange of ideas and knowledge is the spatial separation of individuals who hold complementary knowledge and who could gain from coordinating the actions. Spatially-separated individuals are also likely to have different first languages, notwithstanding the adoption of English as the world's business language. Furthermore, there may be more fundamental differences between national outlooks and routines, which fundamentally influence communication and coordination. Hedlund and Nonaka (1993) examine the way in which information and knowledge are constructed in different cultures. They summarize common perceptions about the differences between Japanese and Western firms in terms of differences in the extent to which the firm's knowledge is 'tacit' or 'articulated' and the degree to which knowledge is held by individuals or groups. Western firms are characterized by individually held, articulated knowledge and Japanese firms by tacit knowledge held at the level of the group. More generally, there are numerous differences in the everyday assumptions (norms) which individuals make about the actions of others in a given situation, about the standards of acceptable behaviour and the interpretation of tacit signals such as body language, which play a major part in the successful coordination of the actions of groups. These differences in routines may in themselves imply differences in performance of some kinds of task (cf. Buckley and Casson, 1992, pp. 228-31) , but where related tasks are to be carried out by individuals who hold different social and cultural assumptions, the dangers of misunderstanding and misinformation may detract significantly from the joint effectiveness of the collaboration, unless considerable time (and expense) is spent in developing mutual understanding. There is considerable evidence that cross-border knowledge transfer within the MNE suffers from 'internal stickiness', and typically requires adaptation to the local context. Furthermore, the need for adaptation increases as the institutional distance between the home and host countries increases ( Jensen and Szulanski, 2004) .
It may be particularly difficult to motivate individuals in different countries diligently to pursue the interests of the organization as a whole. Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 328-30) suggest that the magnitude of these agency costs depend inter alia on the inherent complexity and geographic dispersion of the firms' activities, and are thus likely to be more substantial in MNEs. In the conventional economic arguments on moral hazard and adverse selection in organizations, the monitoring problem is exacerbated by the geographic and cultural distances involved in multinational operations. The risks of opportunism may therefore be higher, and the costs of counter-measures may be higher too. In cultures which do not conform to the individualist stereotype, individuals may identify with a group or community, within which they behave altruistically, or with the shared interest of the community in mind. Thus, it may be expected that individuals will favour the perceived interests of their national subsidiary rather than the overall interests of the firm.
GOVERNANCE AND ATTITUDES TO RISK
An implicit assumption in internalization theory is that the MNE is risk-neutral, and thus that the optimal governance structure can be determined simply by reference to the comparative costs of effecting exchanges through the market and within the hierarchy of the MNE. But this assumption is too simplistic for several reasons.
First, firms do not exhibit stable risk preferences, but 'show unstable risk-taking behavior in the neighbourhood of death, relatively high levels of risk taking when slack resources are large, risk seeking in the neighbourhood of a target, a tendency to change risk preference over time with the same resources, and a tendency to underestimate risks as a result of favourable experience with them' (March and Shapira, 1992, p. 181) . Chiles and McMackin (1996, p. 82) argue that, when a firm is more risk-seeking, the level of asset specificity at which hierarchical organization will be preferred to the market will ceteris paribus be greater. In other words, risk-seeking firms are less likely to be hierarchical than risk-averse firms when faced with the same configuration of transaction costs. One implication of this is that the boundary choice made by the MNE depends not only upon an evaluation of relative transactions costs, but also upon its wider context and upon its past history.
Second, firms do not make decisions about strategy: managers do. Managers may well be less risk-averse than the firm's shareholders, and thus may not actually seek out and/or implement the most efficient governance structure. Hermalin (1993) suggests that managers prefer risky strategies, since these are least informative about their abilities. Reputational risk is not the same as project risk, and the two do not even need to be highly correlated. Managers may also derive various private benefits from certain governance structures, and may favour a more hierarchical structure because their compensation is linked to firm size (Baker et al., 1988) ; because they derive power and prestige from being associated with a larger firm ( Jensen, 1986) ; because their job security is enhanced (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) ; or because a more diversified firm reduces the risks attached to their undiversified personal portfolios (Amihud and Lev, 1981) . The shareholders may introduce monitoring and/or bonding mechanisms to curb this managerial discretion, but these add to the internal transaction costs. Such motivation costs, as noted above, are likely to be more significant in MNEs than in purely domestic firms. And, as Filatochev and Wright note in their companion paper, different types of shareholders (family, institutions, the state) are also likely to have different attitudes towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989) .
Third, the various stakeholders' risk preferences -and hence the risk preference of the MNE -are likely to be influenced by volatility in the global economy. When markets are stable and stakeholders are able to predict comparative transaction costs with some certainty, then all stakeholders will be prepared to be more risk-seeking (at least in relative terms) and the firm may rely more on market transactions. But when product, factor, and financial markets are volatile, all stakeholders are likely to become more risk-averse. The analysis of Chiles and McMackin (1996) suggests that this may increase the perceived costs of market governance and give rise to greater levels of hierarchical control over flows of intermediate products. This volatility will be all the more apparent in international markets for intermediate products, and greater hierarchical control within the MNE is to be expected.
In short, we thus suggest that the chosen governance structure will depend not only upon comparative transaction costs, but also upon the risk preferences of the key decision-makers, the extent of organizational slack, the firm's previous (favourable or unfavourable) experience of risky investments, and the health of the global economy.
A RESEARCH AGENDA
The objectives of this paper have been to outline the contribution of internalization theory to our understanding of the governance of the MNE, and to highlight aspects of the theory that we believe have received insufficient attention and put forward some issues that merit further research. Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic representation of our arguments.
First, we have drawn attention to the various internal transactions costs associated with the governance and organization of activities within the MNE. It is not clear how substantial these costs might be in practice, although Tomassen and Benito (2009) report in their study of Norwegian MNEs that close to 40 per cent of the variation of subsidiary performance can be attributed to governance costs. More work quantifying the size and significance of governance costs would be welcome. Furthermore, it is not obvious how internal governance costs might be affected by the widespread adoption of information and communication technologies (ICT). Certainly, it might be expected that ICT should reduce information and coordination costs (Afuah, 2001) , particularly in MNEs, but the impact upon motivation costs is unclear. On the one hand, ICT should facilitate managerial supervision and monitoring of the employees, but on the other hand, ICT might make it easier for managers to initiate non-optimal strategies from which they derive private benefits. It is also likely that ICT will reduce market transaction costs, so a priori the net impact upon the internalization decision will be indeterminate. A related issue is that internal transaction costs are likely to be very difficult to assess ex ante, particularly within the context of MNE operations in emerging markets, and may only become apparent in the post-contractual phase. This may lead to a reassessment of the optimal governance structure of overseas affiliates (Puck et al., 2009) .
There has been a considerable amount of published research on the interaction between the institutional environment and external transaction costs, and the implications for the governance structure of firms. For instance, Kogut and Singh (1988) considered the effects of national culture on entry mode. Oxley (1999) suggested that firms adopt more hierarchical governance structures in countries where the regimes for , due to: External transaction costs, due to:
• lack of futures markets • impracticability of discriminatory pricing • indeterminate bargaining situations • buyer uncertainty • government interventions
Internal transaction costs, due to: the protection of intellectual property are weak, whilst Brouthers (2002) found that MNEs favoured international joint ventures (IJVs) in markets characterized by stringent legal restrictions. Luo (2005) reported that the contractual structure of IJVs was contingent upon both the nature of the transactions and the institutional environment. Countries' institutional environments may also create market imperfections that influence the effectiveness of MNEs' resource-based advantages (Brouthers et al., 2008; Henisz, 2003) . But there has been relatively little work on how different institutional environments affect internal transaction costs. One promising line of research might focus on the role of trust as a complement to more formal governance mechanisms (Lane and Bachmann, 1998) . Trust typically leads to greater information sharing, more cooperative behaviour, and easier conflict resolution, and thus economizes on internal transaction costs. However, the nature of trust, and the institutional and cultural support for trust, vary in different countries (Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006) . This has important implications for the internal transaction costs of MNEs operating in different host economies, and involving stakeholders from asymmetric trust contexts.
More generally, these observations highlight how differing institutional contextsincluding both the formal rules and the informal norms that govern behaviour and structure social interaction -may have an impact upon transaction costs, and hence upon the governance options available to the MNE. Dunning and Lundan (2008) provide numerous examples of both formal and informal institutions, and suggest that these may affect the perceptions and ideologies of managers, and influence the strategic choices made by MNEs. Clearly there is ample scope here for further research. This should include a deeper examination of the nature of institutions and their impact and progress on the appropriate modelling of their effects.
Second, we have addressed the implications of different assumptions about the risk behaviour of the MNE, and indeed whether it is possible to speak of the risk propensity of the MNE per se. Further work highlighting differences in the risk behaviour of otherwise similar firms would be welcome, as would research on the possible determinants of such differences. One possible line of research would be to look at how changes in ownership (through, for instance, privatization or public listing) impact upon firm boundary decisions. It might be expected that firms with private owners would be more risk-averse than the same firms under public ownership, and thus that privatization should lead to a greater reliance on hierarchical governance structures. Equally, firms with widely-dispersed share ownership are likely to be more risk-seeking compared to the same firms under family ownership, as it is well established that family owners are typically risk-averse because much of their wealth is tied up in the one firm. Related to these points, what is the impact of acquisitions by shareholders from different countries? We have also drawn attention to the fact that it is the managers that make decisions about firm strategy, and that managers may well be less risk-averse than the shareholders. This highlights the need for further research on the process of (international) strategy formation by the managers of MNEs (Buckley et al., 2007) , and the constraints under which such managers operate. It also points to the possibility of agency conflicts between the managers and the shareholders, and to the potential usefulness of agency theory as a complement to internalization theory in understanding the governance of the MNE.
